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 ABSTRACT : A Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) 
is a self-configure network of sensor nodes 
communicate among themselves using radio 
signals and deployed in quantity to sense, monitor 
and to understand the physical world. A jammer is 
an entity which interferes with the physical 
transmission and reception of wireless 
communications. Reactive jamming attack is a 
major security problem in the wireless sensor 
network. The reactive jammer stays quiet when the 
channel is idle. The jammer starts transmitting a 
radio signal as soon as it senses activity on the 
channel. The reactive jammer nodes will be 
deactivated by identifying all the trigger nodes, at 
the same time a jammer node is localized by 
exploiting the changes in the neighbor nodes. The 
affected node can be identified, by analyzing the 
changes in its communication range, compared to 
its neighbors. The paper proposes a survey on 
trigger node identification and a detailed survey on 
techniques to identify trigger nodes and highly 
concentrated on the reactive jammer. 
Keywords - Jammer, Reactive jammer, Trigger 
nodes, Wireless Sensor Networks.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
A Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) is a self-
configure ring network of sensor nodes 
communicating among themselves using radio 
signals and deployed in quantity to sense monitor 
and it understand the physical world. It consists of 
spatially distributed autonomous sensors to monitor 
environmental or physical conditions, such as 
temperature, vibration, sound, pressure, pollutants 
or motion and to cooperatively pass their data 
through the network to a main location. 
The more modern wireless networks are bi-
directional and also enabling to control the activity 
of the sensors. The improvement of wireless sensor 
networks was motivated by military applications 
such as battlefield surveillance, today such type of 
networks are used in many industrial and customer 
applications, such as industrial process observing 
and control, machine condition monitoring and so 
on. 
 
1.1. Sensor Node 
The WSN is built up of nodes, it consists of 
large number of sensor nodes, each sensor nodes 
are directly or indirectly connected to sink node. A 
wireless sensor node is composed of four basic 
components; there are sensing unit, processing unit 
(microcontroller), transceiver unit and power unit.    
 
1.2. Sensing Unit 
The main functionality of the sensing unit is to 
measure or sense the physical data from the target 
area. The signal or analog voltage is generated by 
the sensor corresponding to the observed 
phenomenon. The frequent waveform is digitized 
by an analog-to-digital converter (ADC) and then 
transported to the processing unit for further 
analysis.  
 
1.3. Processing Unit 
The processing unit is related with a small 
storage unit and it manages the processes that make 
the sensor nodes cooperate with the other nodes to 
carry out the assigned tasks. 
 
1.4. Transceiver 
 There are three deploying communication 
schemes in sensors including optical 
communication (laser), radio-frequency (RF) and 
infrared (IF). Laser consumes less energy than 
radio-frequency and provides high security, but it 
requires line of sight and it is sensitive to 
atmospheric conditions. Infrared, laser, needs no 
antenna but it is limited in broadcasting capacity. 
Radio-frequency is the most easy to use but 
requires antenna. Various energy consumption 
reduction strategies have been developed such as 
filtering, modulation, and demodulation. Frequency 
and amplitude modulation are standard 
mechanisms. Amplitude modulation is simple but 
vulnerable to noise. 
 
1.5. Power Unit 
 The power unit is one of the most important 
components of a sensor node. Every sensor node is 
armed with a battery that supplies power to remain 
in active mode. Power consumption is a main 
weakness of sensor networks. Any energy 
preservation schemes can help to extend sensor’s 
lifetime. Batteries used in sensors can be 
categorized into two groups, rechargeable and non-
rechargeable. In harsh environments, it is 
impossible to change or recharge a battery.  
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II. JAMMING ATTACKS 
A jammer is an entity who is purposefully 
trying to interfere with the physical transmission 
and reception of wireless communications [2]. A 
jammer continuously emits Radio Frequency 
signals to fill a wireless channel so that legitimate 
traffic will be completely blocked. 
 
2.1.  Jamming Attack Models 
2.1.1. Constant Jammer 
The Constant Jammer continuously emits a 
radio signal. It sends out random bits to the 
channel. It does not follow any MAC layer 
etiquette. It does not wait for the channel to 
become idle. 
 
2.1.2. Deceptive Jammer 
The Deceptive Jammer constantly injects 
regular packets to the channel. The normal nodes 
will be deceived by the packets. The normal nodes 
just check the preamble and remain silent. The 
jammer can only send out preambles. 
 
2.1.3. Random Jammer 
The Random Jammer alternates between 
jamming and sleeping. After jamming for tj unit of 
time, it turns off its radio and arrives sleeping 
mode. After sleeping for ts unit of time, it wakes up 
and resumes jamming constant or deceptive. The tj 
and ts may be fixed or random intervals-energy 
conservation. 
 
2.1.4. Reactive Jammer 
The Reactive Jammer stays quiet when the 
channel is idle. The jammer starts transmitting a 
radio signal as soon as it senses activity on the 
channel. It does not conserve energy because the 
jammer’s radio must be continuously on in order to 
sense the channel and it is harder to detect. 
Reactive jamming attacks have been considered 
as the most critical and fatally adversarial threats to 
subvert or disrupt the networks since they attack 
the broadcast nature of transmission mediums by 
injecting interfering signals. By identifying trigger 
nodes, the jammers can be avoided and completely 
nullify the reactive jamming attack. 
III. TECHNIQUES TO IDENTIFY 
TRIGGER NODES  
The major techniques for identifying trigger 
nodes in Wireless Sensor Networks are as follows, 
1) Non-adaptive Group Testing 
2) Clique-Independent Set 
3) Trigger-Node Identification 
3.1.1. Non-adaptive Group Testing 
The nature of our work is to identify all 
triggers in the large pool of victim nodes, so this 
technique is naturally matches our problem. The 
key idea of group testing is to test objects in 
multiple groups, instead of individually. 
 
3.1.2. Traditional Non-adaptive Group Testing 
The key idea of Traditional Non-adaptive 
group testing is to test items in multiple designated 
groups instead of testing them one by one[1][3]. 
The traditional Non-adaptive Group Testing 
method of grouping items is based on a designated 
0-1 matrix Mt*n   where the matrix rows represent 
the testing group and each column refers to an item 
in Fig 1. M[i,j]=1 if the jth entry appears in the ith 
testing group, and 0 otherwise. The number of rows 
of the matrix represents the number of groups 
tested in Parallel [1]. Each entry of the result vector 
V refers to the test outcome of the corresponding 
group (row) where 1 represents positive outcome 
and 0 represents negative outcome. 
 
0  0  0  0  1  1  1  1                         0  
0  0  1  1  0  0  1  1                         0  
M =   0  1  0  1  0  1  0  1         V =      1  
 1  1  1  1  0  0  0  0                         1 
 1  1  0  0  1  1  0  0                         1 
 1  0  1  0  1  0  1  0                         1 
 
Fig 1. Matrix Table 
 
The binary testing matrix M and the testing 
outcome vector V. Assumed that entry 1 first 
column and entry 2 second column are positive and 
only the first two groups are return the negative 
outcomes because they do not contain these two 
positive items. All the other four groups are return 
positive outcomes. 
Given that, there are at most d < n positive 
entries among in total n ones, all the d positive 
entries can be correctly recognized on condition 
that the testing matrix M is d-disjunct matrix any 
single column is not contained by the union of any 
other d columns. Owing this property, each 
negative entry will appear in at least one row ie, 
group where all the positive items do not show up.  
By filtering all the entries appearing in groups with 
negative result, and all others are positive outcome. 
Although providing such simple decoding method, 
d-disjunct matrix is nontrivial which involve 
constructing with complicated   computations with 
high overhead [3].  To improve this testing 
overhead, the deterministic d-disjunct matrix used 
to randomize error tolerant d-disjunct matrix, i.e., a 
matrix have less rows but remains the d-disjunct 
matrix. By introducing this matrix, the 
identification is able to handle test errors under 
sophisticated jamming environments. 
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3.1.3. Cliques-Independent Set 
The Cliques-Independent Set is the problem to find 
a set of maximum number of pair wise vertex 
disjoint maximal cliques, which is referred as a 
maximum clique-independent set (MCIS)[4]. To 
the best knowledge, it has already been proved to 
be NP-hard for co comparability, line, planar, and 
total graphs; however, its hardness on UDG is still 
open. There have been numerous polynomial exact 
algorithms for solving the problem on graphs with 
detailed topology, e.g., Helly circular-arc graph and 
strongly chordal graph, but none of these 
algorithms gives the solution on UDG[4].  The 
scanning disk approach is used to find all maximal 
cliques on UDG, and find all the MCIS using a 
greedy algorithm.  
 
IV. TRIGGER NODE 
IDENTIFICATION  
4.1. Anomaly Detection 
Each sensor frequently sends a status report 
message to the base station. Once the jammers are 
activated during the time of message transmissions, 
the base station will not receive the reports from 
the sensors. By comparing the ratio of received 
reports with a predefined threshold value, the base 
station can decide whether a jamming attack is 
happened in the wireless sensor networks [1]. 
When generating the status report message, each 
sensor locally obtains jamming status and decides 
the value of the Label field. If a node v hears 
jamming signals, it will not send out messages but 
keep its label as victim. If v cannot sense jamming 
signals, then its report will be routed to base 
station, if it does not receive ACK from its 
neighbor on the next hop of the route within a time 
out period, it retransmits the signal. If no ACKs are 
received, it is possible that the neighbor node is a 
victim node, and then v updates Label tuple as 
boundary “BN” in its status report and another 
outgoing link from v with the available capacity is 
selected to forward this message.  Base station with 
Label = TN will receive the status report and the 
corresponding node is regarded as unaffected and 
the messages are queued in the buffer of the 
intermediate nodes and forwarded in an first come 
first served manner. The TTL value is reduced by 1 
per hop for each message, and any message will be 
dropped once it’s TTL = 0. 
The base station waits for the status report 
from each node in each period of length P. If no 
reports are received from a node v with maximum 
delay time, then v is considered as victim[1]. The 
maximum delay time is related to graph diameter. 
If the aggregate report amount is less than ψ, the 
base station starts to create the testing schedule for 
the trigger nodes in which the routing tables will be 
updated locally. 
 
4.2. Jammer Property Estimation 
The jamming range R and jammed areas are 
simple polygons based on the locations of the 
boundary and victim nodes. For sparse-jammer 
where the distribution of jammers is relatively 
sparse and there is at least one jammer whose 
jammed area does not overlap with the others[1]. 
By denoting the set of boundary nodes for the ith 
jammed area as BNi, we can estimate the 
coordinate of this jammer as 
  (1) 
where (Xk,Yk) is the coordinate of  a node k is the 
jammed area and the jamming range R. 
R (√(Xk – XJ)2 + (Yk – YJ)2)}                                                                            
(2) 
for all the jammers have the same range.  
For dense-jammer, jammed areas will be 
estimated based on simple polygons containing all 
the boundary nodes and victim nodes which consist 
of three steps which includes.  
1) Discovery of convex hulls of the boundary 
and, does not contains unaffected nodes in the 
convex polygons.  
2) For each boundary node v not on the hull, 
choose any two nodes on the hull and connect v to 
them in such a way that the internal angle at this 
reflex vertex is the smallest one and hence the 
polygon is modified by replacing an edge by the 
two new ones. The resulted polygon is the 
predictable jammed area [1].  
3) Execute the near-linear algorithm to find 
the optimal variable-radii disk cover of all the 
victim nodes by execute the near-linear algorithm, 
but constrained in the polygon and return the 
largest disk radius as R. 
 
4.3. Trigger Detection 
If the jammer behavior is reactive, the straight 
forward way to find all the trigger node is, each 
sensor broadcast the signal  one by one and listen 
to the possible jamming signals. The individual 
detection is quite time consuming and the entire 
victim nodes are isolated for a long detection 
period, or returns wrong detection result in the 
presence of mobile jammers.   
                           Reflex vertex 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                   
 Reflex vertex 
Fig. 2.  Estimated R and jammed area 
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The performance of trigger detection protocol 
toward complicated attacker models with 
probabilistic attack strategies will be validated.
 The base station designs the encrypted testing 
schedule over all the victim nodes based on the set 
of the global topology and the boundary nodes 
stored as a message as illustrated in Table 1 and all 
the boundary nodes are broadcasted. The 
broadcasting of the testing scheduling message 
adopts a routing mechanism similar to reverse path 
forwarding.  
The nodes’ IDs are recorded using their status 
report to the base station on their routing paths. 
Without considering the mobile jammers, the 
routing paths can be reused to send out these 
testing scheduling messages and evade the jammed 
areas. 
 
TABLE 1 Trigger Detection Schedule 
Time Slot Channel  Node List 
0 f1  v1, v3 , .  . . vn 
0 f2 v1,v2,v4,. . .vn-1 
0 : 
. 
 
.  . . . . . . . . . 
0 fm v2,v5,v, . . . vn 
1 f1 v2,v4, . . . vn-1 
: 
. 
: 
. 
 
.  . . . . . . . . . 
 
After receiving the message, each boundary 
node broadcasts the message one time by using 
simple flooding method to its nearby jammed 
region. All the victim nodes execute the testing 
schedule and indicate themselves as non-triggers or 
triggers. All the sensor nodes are prepared with a 
global uniform clock and during the detection time, 
there is no message transmissions to the base 
station are required. The selection of the sets 
involves two-level grouping procedure. 
First-level, all the set of victims are divided 
into several interference-free testing teams. The 
interference free means if the communications 
from the victim nodes in one testing team invoke a 
jammer node, its jamming region will not reach the 
victim nodes in another testing team. By trying 
broadcasting from victim nodes in each testing 
team and monitoring the jamming signals, the 
conclusion of any members in this team are triggers 
and all the tests in different testing teams can be 
executed simultaneously without interference with 
other testing team.  
For example, three maximal cliques 
C1={v1,v2,v3,v4}, C2={v3,v4,v5,v6}, C3={v5,v7,v8,v9} 
can be found within three jammed areas 
respectively in Fig 3. The three teams test at the 
same time. If v4 in the middle team keeps 
broadcasting all the time and J2 is awaken 
frequently, no matter the trigger v2 in the leftmost 
team is broadcasting or not, v3 will always hear the 
jamming signals, so these two are interfere with 
each other. In addition, node-disjoint groups are do 
not necessarily interference free as the rightmost 
and the leftmost teams. 
 
Fig. 3.  Interference teams 
 
Second-level, within the each testing team, 
victims nodes are divided into several testing 
groups. This is concluded by constructing a 
randomized (d,1) disjunct matrix mapping each 
sensor node to a matrix column and make each 
matrix row as a testing group (sensors 
corresponding to the columns with 1s in this row 
are chosen). The tests within one group will 
possibly interfere with another, so each group will 
be assigned with a different frequency channel for 
testing. 
 
V. CONCLUSION AND OPEN ISSUES 
The survey deals with three techniques to 
identify trigger nodes and have identified some 
leftover problem. 
Jammer mobility is one leftover problem to 
this framework, and the identification latency has 
been shown small, it is not efficient toward 
jammers that are moving at a high speed. Jammer 
localizations and jamming resistant routing are 
both quite promising, the service overhead has to 
be further reduced for real-time requirements. 
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